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In the Suprente Court of the 
State of Utah 
FRANK MANWILL, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
ERNEST OYLER, and 
LETA OYLER, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
CASE 
NO. 9346 
Brief of Plaintiff and Respondent 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of fucts as given in the brief of defend-
ants and appellants is considered sufficienrt. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT RULED CORRECTLY, IN DE-
NYING THE MOTION TO DISMISS OF DEFENDANTS 
AND APPELLANTS. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF'S ACTION WAS COMMENCED WITH-
IN THE STATUTORY PERIOD DURING WH[CH SUCH 
ACTION MlGHT PROPERLY BE COMMENCED. 
POINT ill 
THE AGREEMENT ALLEGED IN PLAINTIFF'S 




THE TRIAL COURT RULBD CORRECTLY, IN DE-
NYING THE MOTION TO DISMISS OF DEFENDANTS 
AND APPELLANTS. 
The motion to dismiss of def-endants and appellants 
was based on two eontentions, i.e., (1) that the complaint 
fails to state a cause of aetiO!ll upon which relief can be 
granted, and (2) that all the claims, aotioos, rights, or 
causes of action alleged or attempted to be alleged in fue 
complaint have been ·barred by the statute of limitations 
(R. 4). 
This Oourt has stated in Liquor Conrtro[ COmmission 
vs. Atlhas, 121 Ultah 457, 243 P. 2d 441, the following rule 
with respect to the granting or denial of a motion to dis-
miss: 
"A motion to dismiss should not be granted unl€SS it ap-
pears to a certainlty that plaintiff would be entitled to 
no reH.ef under any state of facts which could be proved 
in support of its claim." 
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This rule of law was reiterated in Blaclmam vs. Snel-
grove, 3 Utah 2d, 157; 280 P. 2d, 453. 
In each of the above drted eases, a motion to dismiss 
had been grnnted by tile trial CoiU11:, and eaJoh case was 
reversed on appeal in aoc&dance wi1Jh the rule of law stated 
above. 
An eX)amination orf the reoonl beforre the OoiU:It, with 
an underlying knowledge of the above quorted rule orf law, 
would seem .1Jo indicate that the trial Judge in rtms case 
exercised his discretion correctly in denying tile motion of 
defendanrts and aJppeHanrt::s, inasmuch as the complaint orf 
the plaintiff certainly does nort di,sclose a sirtuation in which 
''plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under amy state of 
facts which could be proved in support olf his claim.'' 
The compla.im on its f:ace alleges an oral contract be-
tween plaintiff and defendants in Octob&, 1957, whereby 
defendants agreed to repay plaintiff for a ·cerlain principal 
sum wlhich plaintiff had e~nded to pay fo~ a farn1 then· 
occupied by defendants. The parties further agreed that 
defendants would pay plaintiff fior certain personal prop-
etry Wlricih was transferred to defendants by plaintiff in 
1954 (R. 1 and 2). There i1s no allegation in the complaint 
of any claim, liability, debt or agreement befure 1957. The 
complaint does allege that the 1957 agreement was based 
on ce:MJa.in payments and certain transfe,rs orf personalty 
which had taken place during rt:!he years 1950 through 1954, 
(R. 1 and 2) and tt is upon this allegation that 3.1ppel1ants 
base their principle contentions in this appeal. 
Under the rule of law stated ah01ve, the allegations of 
plaintiff's complaint are sufficient to show that plaintiff 
is entitled to relief, if the facts exist as alieged in the com-
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plaint. We therefore respectfully corntend that· the trial 
Oorurt ruled correctly. in denying defendants' motioo to ~ 
miss. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF'S ACTION WAS COMMENCED WITH-
IN THE STATUTORY PERIOD DURING WH!ICH SUCH 
ACTION MIGHT PROPERLY BE COMMENCED. 
Appellants allege that there are certain aspects of 
plaintiff's complaint which woruld indicate a theocy that 
some eause of action against defendants accrued in favor 
of plaintiff during the years 1950-1954 (A-ppellant's Brief, 
page 4). Appellants further contend that a cause of aotion 
on vhe theory of assumpsit arose in favor of plaintiff dw-
ing the years 1950-1954, and that the statute of limitations 
forr such cause orf action commenced to run rut the time 
plaintiff made such payments or eooferred any h...anefit upon 
defendants. On rfJhat basis, appeUants ·conclude that the 
1957 agreement alleged in plaintiff's eomplaint must neces-
sarily have been an "acknowledgment of an exising liabil-
ity" or a "promise to pay the same", which vidlates Sec-
tion78-12-44, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, because it is not 
in writing. 
Plaintiff's complaint alleges that defendants agreed to 
repay plaintiff for certain "sums which he had expended 
in making payments on a furm now occupied by defend-
ants" (R. 1). The complaint further alleges an agreement 
· by defendant to pay for certain personalty whtch had been 
transferred to them in 1954 (R. 1 and 2). Notlhing what-
ever in the record before the Court indicates tJh.e rel,ation-
sbip of t!he parties, their conduct, or the circumstances -un-
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der which these transactions took place. Indeed, there· is 
no indication from the record of any personal c01Il1Jact what-
ever between plaintiff and defendants before 1957. Re-
spondent contends that the mere making of payments ·and 
transfer of personalty does not give rise to an implied pro-
mise by defendants to make immediate payment therefor 
to plaintiff. An action in assumpsit may be based on eirfuer 
an express or implied contract (4 Am. Jur., Assumpsit, 
Section 2). We assume from appellants' discussion of ·this 
point that they -contend that an implied contract arose be-
tween plaintiff and defendants during the years 1950-1954. 
Respondent admits the possibility that such an agreement 
might be implied in law, burt suoh implication-could be drawn 
only :f.irom the conduct o[ the parties or the · circumstJa.nces 
of tile case. Certainly such an implicatioo is one which 
could ·be made only after the taking of evidence as to these 
matters, and full knowledge of all of ·the facts, and could 
not be made from the present record. 
Evern if the ·creation of a contract by implication were 
possible from tlhe present record, what are the terms of 
such implied contract? When, if such implied. cont~act is 
to be created, were defendants to make payment to plain-
tiff? 
The above questions would appear· to. be e:xtremely im-
portant in dete,:rniining when the statute of limitation8·6n 
such implied contract commenced to run. Apl>ellant ·.cites 
cer1Ja.in authorities in support of his contention that the 
statute of limitations begins to run at the time plain:tiff 
makes any payment or confers ·any benefit om defendants 
(Appellants' brief, page 3). Neither of the authorities qited 
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by appellant would seem to support this statementf based 
on the fucts of this case. 
The statute of limitations on any cause of action based 
on contract begins to run only after a breach of such con-
tract. This contention is sustained by one of the authori-
ties cited by appellants (34 Am. Jur., limitation of Acti.OillS, 
Section 113). Irt is started therein, "As the rule is otherwise 
expressed, a right of action accrues whenever such a breach 
orf durty or contract ha:s ooCWTed, or such a wrong has been 
sustained as will give a right to bring and sustain a suit." 
The rule has also been stated as follows: 
"The general rule· governing the commencement of the 
running of the statute is ;that the statutory . period is 
oompurted from the time when the right of action which 
the plaintiff seeks to enforce first aocrues, that is, or-
dmarily in an action based on a contract, as soon as 
there is a breach of contract." 
(Williston on Contracts, Revised Edition, Section 2004) 
This Court has said on this point: 
"It is a rule of universal application that a cause or right 
of action arises the moment an action may be main-
tamed to enforce it and that the statute of limitations 
is then set in ·motion. The test, therefore, is, can an 
action be maintained upon the particular cause of ac-
tion in question?" 
Sweetster v. Fox, 43 Utah 40, 134 Pac. 599. See also Last 
chance Ranch Co. v. Erickson, 82 Utah 475, 25 P. 2d 952. 
Also, there are several recognized exceptions to this 
genera1 rule (supra, Seotioo 2022). One of these excep-
tions, quoted as follows, could be particularly applicable 
here: 
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''Where the plaintiff has undertaken a continuous per-
formance though consisting of several items, and the 
defendant, though he has eX!pressly or impliedly pro-
mised to pay rt:Jherefor, has not promised to do so at 
any particul'ar time." 
Hence, in order to determine the time of commence-
ment of the rtmning of rthe statute of limitaions in an ac-
tion based on !implied contract, one must :first detennine 
when a brooch has oocuvred, and whe1JheT one of the ex-
ceptions to the general rule is applicable. This, orf course, 
is impossible without implying ~the tenns of payment, which 
implioatioo, it is respectfully contended, is impossible from 
the presenlt record. 
The foregoing is, we feel, illustrative of our contention 
that the creation of an implied contract is only possible 
with 'a full knowledge of ·all of 1Jhe facts orf the case. Hence, 
although respondent freely admits the possibility that an 
implied contract is capable of proof in this case, the oppo-
site is likewise true. If the proof is such that a contract 
cannot be implied from the conduct of the parties oT ciT-
cumstances of the oase, then it follows that the oral agree-
ment of 1957 is not an acknowledgment olf an existing lia-
bility, but is, as respondent alleges, an agreement of first 
instance. It would then follow rthat such oml agreement 
could not violate Section 78-12-44, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, and ·it would further follow that this action based on 
such agreement was commenced well within the period 
provided in 78-12-25 (1). This Section provides as follows: 
"Within four years: (1) an aotion upon a contract, ob--
ligation or liability not founded upon an instrument in 
writing ... " 
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So long as the possibility exists that plaintiff can prorve 
these allegations, under the State of facts as all.eged, he 
shOuld not be denied his day in Court by fue granting of a 
motion :to dismiss. 
Appellarnts contend that by demanding interest from 
the dates that the original payments on the farn1 were made 
by plaintiff and by t!he use of the word "repay" plaintiff's 
complaint somehow supports a theory that some cause of 
action in ~avor of plaintiff arose in 1950-54 (Appellant's 
brief, page 4). The theory .o[ plaintiff is dear enough on 
the face of the complaint, without searching for hidden 
meanings. _We fail to denote any significance Whatever in 
the use of the wru-d "repay" as compared to .!'pay", or any 
otheT word in ·the context of plaintiff's complaint. 
With respect to interest, the . complaint alleges that 
the agreement ad: 1957 was foc the repayment of the prin-
cipal sum only (R. 1). The prayer foc interest was added 
by ICO!tlnSel in accordance with Sectioo 15-1-1, Utah Code 
. Annotated, 1953, and the cases noted in the annotation fol-
lowing rthat section. The law is quite dear that if plaintiff 
is entitled to ·recorver the principal sum alleged in his com-
plaint, he is entitled rto recover interest on those monies 
·at the statutory rate :f.irom the time the monies were paid 
to the present. We fail to see that this 'prayer for interest 
denotes any theory rtJhat a cause of action arose in favor 
of plaintiff in the years 1950-54. 
On the basis of the foregoing, respondent respectfully 
contends that the agreement of 1957 alleged in plaintiff's 
complaint was an agreement of first ins1Ja.nce, that a breach 
. ·of rthat agreement occurred on the part of the defendants, 
and that plaintiff commenced an action against defendants 
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for such breach within the statutory period provided for 
the commencement of such action. 
POINT ill 
THE AGREElVIENT ALLEGED IN PLAINTIFF'S 
COMPLAINT WAS SUPPORTED BY SUFFlCIENT CON-
SIDERATION. 
It appears on the face of the complaint that the agree-
ment of the pa.rties ilil 1957 was based on a consideration, 
on plaintiff's part, of past benefits conferred on defend-
ants. It is true ;tJhat in respondent's Answer to Petition for 
Intermediate Appeal, reference was made to this as "past 
consideration.'' 
HJowever, as Mr. Williston points out, the term "past 
oonsidemrtion", is self-cnntradiotory (Williston on Contmcts, 
'Dh:ird Edition, SectiO!ll 142). More p~operly, we refer to 
the consideration which we contend supports the agreement 
between the parties, as "moral cons~detVation." The un-
derlying ques:tiO!ll of whether a moral obligation is sufficient 
to constitute "moral consideration", is discussed art length 
by Mr. Williston in his treatise. (See Williston on Con-
tracts, Third Edition, Seetions 142, 147-149) ~ 
The general rule with respect to the application of this 
doctrine is found at 12 Am. Jur., Contracts, Section 107, 
wherein the following statement is made: 
"When, however, the past conside,ration consisted o[ 
material pecuniary benefit, which although not moved 
by a previous request, was conferred upon the promis-
sor in such circumstances as to create a moral obli-
gation and has not been ex:hausted by furnishing con-
sideration for another legal obligation already per-
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formed or still enforceable, there is considerable au-
thority for the view that it will support a subsequent 
exerutocy promise. ~o render i:his doctrine applimble, 
it must appear: (1) That the service or other consid-
eration moving from the promissee conferred an ac-
tual material or pecuniary benefit on the pvomissor, 
and not merely that it resulted in detriment to ;the 
promissee; (2) That 1:he promissee e~ed to be 
compensated rthm-efior, and did not intend it to be a mere 
gift or gmtuity; (3) · That fue circumstances were 
such as to create a moral obligation on the pwt of the 
promissor; and ( 4) That the benefit received has not 
eonsrtituted the consideration for :another p1 .. omise al-
ready performed or still legally enforceable." 
It wou1d appear that all of the four criteria mentioned 
above are present in this particular ease. Certainly defend-
ants received an actual material or pecuniary benefit, _in 
that rthey have beoome the legal owners of real p:rop._orty 
and ifJhe personal property purehased by plaintiff wit~ his 
money. Secondly, from the very beginning of this tran-
saction, plaintiff expected to be reimbursed foc the monies 
expended, and at no time intended these monies to be gifts 
or gmstuities. Thi:nlly, the facts related abo~e certainly 
are such as ;to create the highest kind of m()['al obligatioo 
on the part of the defendants to pay for tJhe land which 
they presently occupy and are making their living from. 
Fourthly, the benefit received has not constituted the con-
sideration for any other promise either already performed 
or still enforceable. 
The doctrine of moral consideration is discussed in 
some detail ·at 8 ALR 2d, page 781. Numerous cases are 
cited from various jurisdictions which have adopted the 
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doctrine, and in summarizing the annotation, the following 
statement is made, 
"While some Courts, particularly in the earlier cases, 
have been inclined to recognize a. mo~al obligation as 
consideration for an executocy promise oruy where the 
obligation rested upon a pre-existing legal liability, 
the trend of modem authorities is definitely to rthe ef-
fect that a pre-e~srti.ng legal liability is nort essential 
in order that a moral consideration be sufficient to 
support an executory promise and ·that a moral obli-
gation is suf:tiicient to surpport an executory promise 
where the promissor has originally received from the 
promissee something of value in the fmm of a pecuniary 
or material belllefLt, under such circumstances as rto 
create a ~moral oblibation on the part of the promissor 
to pay for what he received, even though there was no 
antecedent or contemporaneous promi·se or request, 
and no legal liability at any time prior to the subse-
quent expressed promise.'' 
No Utah oases have been found, either supporting or 
rejecting this doctrine. However, as suggested by Mr. Wil-
l~, ·this doctrine has been devised by the Courts in o~­
der to overcome a defense whidh, although technically valid, 
has no substantial foundation in justice. 
We recognize that the application of such a doctrine 
should be limited; however, respondent respectfully con-
tends that the ~acts of rthis case bring it within that class 
of oases to which this doctrine is applicable and properly 
applied, in order that justice may be done. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully submits, on the basis of the 
foregoing, that the trial Court properly denied defendants' 
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motion rtJo dismiss, and that the action of the trial Cowt 
in so doing should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHRISTENSON, NOVAK, PAULSON 
AND TAYLOR 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
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